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Imagining school autonomy in high-performing education
systems: East Asia as a source of policy referencing in England
Yun You* and Paul Morris
Institution of Education, University College London, London, UK
Education reform is increasingly based on emulating the features of
‘world-class’ systems that top international attainment surveys and, in
England speciﬁcally, East Asia is referenced as the ‘inspiration’ for their
education reforms. However, the extent to which the features identiﬁed
by the UK Government accord with the situation within East Asia is
problematic. This paper examines the relationship between the English
representation and the ‘reality’ of East Asian education systems, using
school autonomy as an illustrative example. We focus on Singapore,
Hong Kong and Shanghai, which are cited extensively to legitimate
policies providing greater autonomy for schools in England. We argue
ﬁrstly that the English representation has been largely discursive and
inaccurate; has failed to recognise the variations across the region; and
has been selected to endorse the Government’s ideological preferences.
Secondly, the scope, form and nature of school autonomy vary
markedly, and are operationalised in each society in ways reﬂecting the
prevailing sociopolitical priorities.
Keywords: school autonomy; East Asia; England; policy borrowing/
referencing
Introduction
Visitors to England from China were surprised by the former Education
Secretary’s statement: ‘I’d like us to implement a cultural revolution just
like the one they’ve had in China’ (Gove 2010). The surprise was twofold:
(1) his admiration for the Chinese ‘Cultural Revolution’ and (2) his enthusi-
asm for learning from East Asian education systems. Historically, the ﬂow
has been in the opposite direction: East Asia has a long record of seeking
to imitate ‘advanced’ Western models and this trend has continued to date.
For example, as part of the Meiji Restoration, a Japanese Government del-
egation toured the USA and Europe to study modern education systems
and, more recently, as Forestier and Crossley (2014, 8) note, the UK has
become ‘a signiﬁcant source of expertise’ for the post-1997 Hong Kong
reforms.
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The reverse of this trend has emerged not just in England but also in
other Western countries, such as the USA and Australia (Waldow,
Takayama, and Sung 2014). Sellar and Lingard (2013) argue that, in addi-
tion to Finland, East Asia has become the new ‘poster boy’ in the global
discourse of education policy borrowing. Countries and cities in the region,
especially Singapore, South Korea, Shanghai and Hong Kong, have been
promoted as models of a ‘world-class’ system by a network of academics,
think tanks, consultancies and international organisations, such as McKinsey
and Pearson ( Auld and Morris 2014). The resulting call to look ‘East’ has
been largely based on an assumed connection between East Asia’s dramatic
economic growth and its educational ‘success’, as measured by international
surveys of pupil achievement, particularly the Programme for International
Student Assessment (PISA) (Morris 2015).
Proponents of World Culture (e.g. Meyer et al. 1997) have argued that
the resulting patterns of policy borrowing, which have occurred as nations
seek to emulate the features of ‘world-class’ systems, has facilitated the con-
vergence of education systems to an essentially ‘western model’. However,
many scholars (e.g. Schriewer 1990; Steiner-Khamsi 2012), drawing on
Luhmann’s ‘system theory’ and its core concept, ‘externalisation’, have
demonstrated that external inﬂuences do not necessarily lead to changes to
the home system. As Schriewer and Martinez (2004, 32) elaborate, the
home system inherently and freely ﬁlters and selects a limited amount of
information from the international environment and ‘rearranges’ it depend-
ing on the home system’s ‘internal needs for “supplementary meaning”’. In
this way, the home system maintains and reinforces its long-standing iden-
tity and distinctiveness (Rappleye 2012). Luhmann (1981, 40) argues that
‘system-internal interpretative acts … do not provide reliable information on
… what is actually going on in the world.’
From the perspective of ‘externalisation’, three interconnected considera-
tions are pertinent in understanding policy borrowing as a speciﬁc form of
evidence-based policy-making. Firstly, as Steiner-Khamsi (2014, 156)
argues, policy borrowing has never been ‘wholesale’; rather, it has reﬂected
‘the ‘socio-logic’ or context-speciﬁc reasons for receptiveness’ as policy
actors search for international evidence that is most compatible with their
desired policy actions. Secondly, as Morris (2012) demonstrates, the interna-
tional evidence harnessed to promote domestic reforms has often been
selected, and misinterpreted, to legitimate speciﬁc ideological agendas.
Thirdly, Rappleye (2012, 125) uses the metaphor of ‘political theatre’: pol-
icy attraction and ‘borrowing’ serve as a form of ‘political stagecraft’ in
which political players write their own ‘script’ on the basis of ‘pre-existing
ideological convictions’, then perform the ‘drama’ of ‘borrowing’, attempt-
ing to ‘erase’ its ‘political origins’ and ‘produce salutary effects amongst
the audience ….’ Waldow (2012, 419) similarly notes that the value lies in
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the images or pictures that are portrayed and whether or not they actually
portray anything ‘real’ is ‘beside the point’.
Taylor (2004) deﬁnes such images as a ‘social imaginary’ that generates
legitimacy for social practices by reﬂecting the views of social reality (how
things usually go) and norms (how things ought to go) shared by ordinary
people. Rizvi (2006, 198) also emphasises the importance for governments
to develop and exercise ‘a social imaginary within which policy practices
are located’. Takayama (2010) argues that, rather than pursuing the ‘reality’
of reference societies, policy actors are more interested in using their images
to mobilise the public’s feelings of anxiety, fear, despair and hope in an
attempt to promote their favoured education reforms.
England’s PISA ranking, and by association its educational standards,
have been portrayed domestically as dramatically falling since 2003, espe-
cially in contrast to top-performing East Asian societies (DfE 2010). This
portrayal has been reinforced by headlines such as ‘China’s Poorest Beat
Our Best Pupils’ (The Telegraph, February 17, 2014) and ‘English Pupils
“Two Years Behind” Asian Peers in Maths’ (The Independent, February 22,
2013). In the 2010 Schools White Paper (SWP), the Government claimed
that ‘the only way we can catch up, and have the world-class schools our
children deserve, is by learning the lessons of other countries’ success’
(DfE 2010, 3). East Asia has become the main source of policy borrowing
in England.
However, the Government’s identiﬁcation, description and interpretation
of the features of schooling in East Asia have not been subjected to critical
scrutiny and there has been a tendency to portray the education systems of
East Asia as a homogeneous and undifferentiated entity. Using school
autonomy as an example, this paper investigates whether the Government’s
representation of education systems in East Asia accords with the ‘reality’
as perceived within the domestic context. As PISA is undertaken by 15-
year-old pupils, this paper focuses on the main types of secondary schools
in Hong Kong (aided and Direct Subsidy Scheme [DSS] schools); Singa-
pore (government and aided schools, including autonomous schools, and
independent schools); and Shanghai (government and government-sponsored
people-run schools) and compare these to the main types of secondary
schools in England (academies and free schools).
The English representation is examined by analysing ofﬁcial documents
including policy papers, announcements and speeches, and reports (e.g.
OECD and McKinsey), which were referenced to provide the evidence for
the promotion of school autonomy, especially with regard to East Asia. We
are concerned with what the images of school autonomy in East Asia are,
how the UK Government has discursively constructed them and how they
have impacted on policy-making in England. The investigation of the ‘real-
ity’ draws on a triangulated analysis of three sources of data: (1) policy
documents that deﬁne the autonomy of schools; (2) secondary literature that
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has interpreted it; and (3) semi-structured interviews with 19 secondary
school principals, who were selected because, apart from being responsible
for their schools, they were also active in one or more of the various policy
advisory and/or principal representative bodies that are part of the broader
policy community, as well as 12 scholars, journalists and policymakers,
who are specialists in, and have commented publicly on aspects of school
governance in the three East Asian societies. Together, these three sources
of data combined to provide a portrayal of both the nature of ofﬁcial inten-
tions and how it was interpreted and operationalised within schools. This
ensured our evidence was not solely reliant on statements of policy intent.
We argue ﬁrstly that the English representation has been largely discur-
sive and inaccurate; has failed to recognise the variations across the region;
and has been used to endorse the Government’s policy preferences. In this
paper, ‘policy borrowing’, as the most commonly used term in the literature,
is retained to discuss that literature. However, in discussing the gap between
the representation and the ‘reality’, the term ‘policy referencing’ is more
appropriate than ‘policy borrowing’ – ‘referencing’ avoids suggesting that
policy actions are directly transferred from one country to another. In the
following sections, we ﬁrst demonstrate how the Government has imagined
and constructed school autonomy in East Asia and then we explore how
school autonomy is operationalised and is perceived within each of the three
East Asian societies.
The English representation
In the SWP, the top performers in PISA ‘from Alberta to Singapore, Finland
to Hong Kong, Harlem to South Korea’ were described as the ‘inspiration’
for education reforms in England (DfE 2010, 7). After examining their com-
mon features, three key lessons were identiﬁed:
The most successful countries already combine a high status teaching profes-
sion; high levels of autonomy for schools; a comprehensive and effective
accountability system and a strong sense of aspiration for all children, what-
ever their background. (DfE 2010, 5)
This suggested that East Asia, which includes many of ‘the most successful
countries’, enjoys high levels of school autonomy and that this has con-
tributed to its educational ‘success’. However, in the SWP, there was little
direct reference to speciﬁc East Asian exemplars to support the claims about
school autonomy. South Korea was mentioned once:
Finland and South Korea – the highest performing countries in PISA – have
clearly deﬁned and challenging universal standards, along with individual
school autonomy. (DfE 2010, 4)
4 Y. You and P. Morris
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Singapore and South Korea were, however, cited four times to highlight the
weakness of England’s education system and to support the need for high
quality teachers. Despite their low PISA rankings, charter schools in the
USA, free schools in Sweden and city technology colleges and academies
in England were frequently cited to support the assertion that ‘in many of
the highest-performing jurisdictions, school autonomy is central’ (DfE 2010,
51). Furthermore, little attempt was made to clarify the precise scope, form
and nature of school autonomy in the systems referenced, which left ample
space for the Government to cite evidence relating to this generic concept.
A series of policy initiatives were subsequently proposed in the SWP to
increase autonomy in English schools. These included: (1) removing
unnecessary central prescription about curriculum and qualiﬁcations, (2)
increasing autonomy for all schools, (3) dramatically extending the academy
programme by getting existing schools to convert to Academy status and
(4) supporting teachers, parents, charities and enterprises to set up new free
schools. Further, academies and free schools (public-funded and free from
the control of local authorities) were given more power to establish their
own mission and ‘ethos’, design their curriculum, raise standards, determine
teachers’ salaries, extend school hours and recruit untrained/unqualiﬁed
teachers.
More recently, the importance and necessity of school autonomy has
been reiterated in numerous ofﬁcial announcements and speeches (e.g. Gove
2014; Truss 2013) and East Asian societies have been increasingly
referenced. For example:
In Singapore, often cited as an exemplar of centralism, the Government has
deliberately encouraged greater diversity in the school system – and dramatic
leaps in attainment have been secured as a result. Schools where principals
are exercising a progressively greater degree of operational autonomy are
soaring ahead. And as the scope for innovation has grown, so Singapore’s
competitive advantage over other nations has grown too. (Gove 2011)
Winstanley, Sorabji and Dawson’s (1995) distinction between ‘criteria
power’ and ‘operational power’ is pertinent; the former refers to the power
to deﬁne the aims, purpose and framework of service provision, and the lat-
ter means the power to decide how service is delivered. As we will see
below, the power given to selected schools in East Asia focuses on ‘opera-
tional power’.
Later, in responding to England’s ‘stagnancy’ in the PISA 2012 result,
Gove (2013) reafﬁrmed the lessons that England should draw from high-
performing and fast-improving systems. With regard to school autonomy, he
stated:
There is a strong correlation in these league tables between freedom for heads
– in systems like Singapore, Shanghai and Hong Kong – and improved
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results. That is why we have dramatically increased the number of academies
and free schools – and given heads more control over teacher training, con-
tinuous professional development and the improvement of underperforming
schools. The School Direct programme – by giving heads control of teacher
recruitment – has improved the quality of new teachers.
The Schools Minister, Nick Gibb (2014), more recently claimed that the
‘academisation’ (conversion to academy status) of schools in England since
2010 had signiﬁcantly improved the performance of schools and he speciﬁ-
cally applauded the granting of ‘real’ autonomy to schools to ‘vary their
curriculum, extend the length of their school day and employ the best teach-
ers – regardless of whether they have received formal qualiﬁed teacher sta-
tus’ . In parallel, the Government has sought to create a more demanding
and rigorous national curriculum and has similarly relied heavily on evi-
dence from East Asia. However, neither academies nor free schools are
required to follow the National Curriculum.
The Government’s effort to demonstrate the importance of school
autonomy has also drawn on the work of the OECD. For example:
In its most recent international survey of education, the OECD found that ‘in
countries where schools have greater autonomy over what is taught and how
pupils are assessed, pupils tend to perform better’. (Gove 2011)
However, the evidence drawn from the OECD has sometimes been used
selectively. For example, the OECD (2010) was cited as the source for the
following assertion in the SWP:
Across the world, the case for the beneﬁts of school autonomy has been
established beyond doubt …. Analysis of PISA data shows that the features
of the strongest education systems combine autonomy (e.g. over stafﬁng pow-
ers at school level) with accountability (e.g. systematic and external pupil-
level assessments). (DfE 2010, 51)
Morris (2012) notes that, although the OECD stated that a growing number
of countries have established more autonomous schools, it did not make
any claims about their impact on pupil achievement. In its report, the OECD
(2013, 4) was speciﬁc that ‘school systems with high overall levels of per-
formance tend to grant more autonomy to schools in designing curricula
and assessments and seek feedback from pupils for quality-assurance and
improvement’. However, according to the results of the school context ques-
tionnaire conducted along with the PISA 2012, schools in England are
reported to enjoy greater autonomy than their East Asian counterparts in
almost all surveyed aspects, such as appointing teachers, setting teachers’
salaries, formulating school budgets, choosing textbooks, determining sub-
jects and establishing assessment policies (OECD 2013).
6 Y. You and P. Morris
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In contrast, the 2007 McKinsey report, which the Government cited
extensively with regard to teacher education, was ignored in the promotion
of school autonomy. The report stated that, ‘few of the most widely sup-
ported reform strategies (for instance, giving schools more autonomy, or
reducing class sizes) have produced the results promised for them’ (Barber
and Mourshed 2007, 10). It also claimed that the reason for Singapore’s
success is its strong central control. The subsequent 2010 McKinsey report
adopted a more favourable attitude towards school autonomy, arguing that
top performers such as Singapore and Hong Kong have exercised looser
control when their education systems have become ‘great’ (Mourshed, Chi-
jioke, and Barber 2010).
Notwithstanding these considerations, assertions that high levels of
school autonomy help to explain high performance in East Asia were used
to support policies in England designed to grant schools greater autonomy.
The policy initiatives subsequently promoted in England have involved
changes to three major areas:
(1) Governance and management – no restrictions on who can set up,
govern and manage public-funded schools
(2) Curriculum and school calendar – schools can decide whether to fol-
low the national curriculum and set the school terms and hours
(3) Teachers – schools are able to hire untrained/unqualiﬁed teachers and
set teachers’ salaries.
Below we examine the prevailing policies and practices in these three
areas in Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai.
School autonomy in East Asia: policies and perceptions
Governance and management
Approximately, 79% of public-funded secondary schools in Hong Kong are
aided schools, catering for 80% of public secondary pupils, fully subsidised
by the government and operated by more than 200 school sponsoring bodies
(SSBs), such as churches, charities and non-governmental organisations,
under a contractual agreement with the government – the Code of Aid
(EDB 2014a). As part of the school-based management reform, all aided
schools have since 2005 been required to establish Incorporated Manage-
ment Committees (IMCs). The major change is that the percentage of man-
agers chosen by SSBs was reduced to 60%.1 As stipulated in the Education
Ordinance, SSBs provide guidelines for IMCs and supervise their perfor-
mance, as well as establishing the vision and mission of a school; IMCs
take charge of daily school operation. Nevertheless, the major sponsoring
bodies (e.g. the Catholic and Anglican Churches) were concerned that they
would lose control of their schools, as under the new governance
framework IMCs are directly accountable to the Education Bureau (EDB)
(Pang 2008).
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The DSS was introduced in Hong Kong in 1991. In total, 13% of pub-
lic-funded secondary schools operate under this scheme, serving 13% of
public secondary pupils (EDB 2014b). They are allowed to set their own
tuition fees and obtain donations, and continue to receive government
subsidies (Law 2007). Chan and Tan (2008) argue that the DSS is a ‘pub-
lic-aided’ approach to privatisation. In addition, DSS schools enjoy more
ﬂexibility in terms of personnel management, language of instruction and
student admission compared with their aided counterparts. Particularly,
IMCs are not required for them (Pang 2008). Whilst initially the scheme
provided a convenient route for former communist schools to obtain public
funding, the capacity to charge fees and select pupils subsequently attracted
many elite schools to join.
In Singapore, all public-funded schools are subject to the policy and con-
trol of the Ministry of Education (SMOE). There are 71% of public sec-
ondary pupils enrolled in government schools (73% of all public-funded
secondary schools) and 20% in aided schools (18%) (SMOE 2014). Aided
schools were mainly established by religious groups, but obtain government
subsidies for up to 90% of their total revenue. High performing government
and aided schools can also be designated as ‘autonomous’ schools (16%).
Additionally, independent schools (5%), receive an annual per capita grant
equivalent to the recurrent cost in government schools. Autonomous and
independent schools have been selected by the SMOE, based on their
academic merit, and are given more leeway in managing their curriculum,
personnel, ﬁnance and student admission (Gopinathan and Mardiana 2013).
Schools from all categories are operated by their management committees
or governing boards.
Schools in Singapore are grouped into 28 geographic clusters that oper-
ate as an intermediate level of governance between the SMOE and schools.
Membership of a cluster is compulsory for all public-funded schools except
for independent schools. Cluster superintendents are given an annual budget
to promote collaboration amongst schools, identify career development
needs and personnel with potential, and offer ﬁnancial support for worth-
while school projects. They also supervise and evaluate the performance of
principals and vice-principals (Sclafani 2008). In this way, administrative
power as to ﬁnance, personnel and appraisal has been transferred from the
central level to the cluster level.
Shanghai is one of the four provincial-level municipalities under the
direct leadership of the central government. A series of national decentral-
isation reforms since 1985 have shifted most administrative and ﬁscal power
and responsibility for education to the municipal government (Hawkins
2006). Under the guidance of the Ministry of Education (CMOE), a ‘Two
Tier Government, Two Tier Management’ system has since been established
in Shanghai (Shen 2007). This means that the Shanghai Municipal
Education Commission (SMEC) is responsible for implementing national
8 Y. You and P. Morris
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education policies and formulating municipal education policies; district
education bureaus (DEBs) have the authority to implement municipal educa-
tion policies, ﬁnance public schools and monitor their performance (SMEC
2010). Within schools, the Principal Responsibility System introduced in
1985 enables principals, rather than Party secretaries, to run schools.
Since the 1980s, Shanghai has spearheaded the development of people-
run (minban) schools, which are, in theory, sponsored and managed by non-
governmental organisations and individuals. By 2014, 89% of secondary
pupils study in government secondary schools (88% of local secondary
schools), while people-run secondary schools (12%) cater for 11% of sec-
ondary pupils. In reality, 90% of people-run schools are directly or indi-
rectly ﬁnanced and monitored by DEBs and, as Ding (2012, 70) argues,
they ‘bear no essential differences from public schools’ in terms of curricu-
lum, ﬁnance and appointment of school leaders. Only 10% of people-run
schools are independent, privately funded and operated with relatively more
autonomy (Ding 2012). In other words, only about 1% of local secondary
schools in Shanghai operate with a high degree of autonomy.
Curriculum and school calendar
In Hong Kong, aided schools are required by the EDB to prepare their
pupils for the local public examination, they adopt the mainstream curricu-
lum prescribed by the EDB and are assessed by the Hong Kong Examina-
tion and Assessment Authority. In contrast, 11 out of 62 DSS secondary
schools are allowed to offer up to 50% of their intake alternatives to the
mainstream curriculum, such as the International Baccalaureate Diploma
and General Certiﬁcate Education A-levels (SCMP Good Schools Guide,
June 24, 2013). The mainstream curriculum includes eight Key Learning
Areas with a range of permitted compulsory and optional subjects. For each
area there is a detailed guide specifying curriculum aims, content, time
allocation, learning and teaching strategies, assessments and resources (CDC
2002). Based on the guide, various commercial textbook publishers decide
the depth of coverage and the way that topics are explained and presented
(Morris and Adamson 2010). The textbooks used are chosen from a
‘recommended list’ drawn up by the EDB.
School-based curriculum development (SBCD) has been promoted in
HK since the 1980s. However, rather than providing an alternative curricu-
lum, Marsh, Morris and Lo (2014, 36) argue that SBCD ‘has been, and
remains, a means to reify the central curriculum reform initiatives by mak-
ing them more relevant to and therefore more feasible in the local (school)
context’. One principal explained that ‘unless it [SBCD] is designed for the
public examination … it dies.’ The Education and Manpower Bureau2
(2005) stipulates that there should be no less than 190 school days and
90–93 holidays a year, and that the proposed list of school holidays should
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be submitted for approval. Under this general guideline, schools are encour-
aged to design their own calendar ﬂexibly to meet their local needs.
Secondary pupils in Singapore are divided into three curricula streams,
namely, express, normal academic and normal technical, depending on their
results in the Primary School Leaving Examination. The national curriculum
comprises of a group of prescribed compulsory and optional subjects
assessed in national examinations. Pupils from different streams are offered
different subjects or different levels of complexity in subject coverage fol-
lowing the SMOE guidance (Tan 2014). Autonomous and independent
schools, recruiting the most academically able pupils, are given the power
to set their own curricula; nonetheless, only a few of them have strayed sig-
niﬁcantly from the national curriculum (Tan 2006). One scholar interviewed
maintained that ‘Singapore is still stuck in the common curriculum.’
The SMOE is responsible for providing the ‘Approved Textbooks List’,
inviting experts to write textbooks for History and Civics and Moral Educa-
tion, designing syllabuses, assessment modes and special curriculum pro-
grammes, monitoring their implementation, and promoting pedagogical
approaches. Although SBCD has been promoted in Singapore since the
1980s, as Deng, Gopinathan and Lee (2013) argue, it has referred to the
adaption, modiﬁcation and translation of the national curriculum in speciﬁc
school contexts. The SMOE sets school terms and stipulates 40 periods of
40-minute curriculum hours per week for secondary schools (Straughan
2011). According to one principal, although schools are allowed to vary the
instruction hours, the room left to do so is actually limited.
In Shanghai, pupils from public-funded schools sit for central entrance
examinations organised at the municipal level. Following the CMOE’s
requirements, the SMEC categorises the curriculum into three components:
the basic course (or national course, 75–80%), which is subject-centric,
standardised by the CMOE, compulsory for all public schools and centrally
examined; the enriched course (10–15%) and the inquiry-based course
(5%), which are both school-based and not-examined, but developed in
compliance with the municipal guidelines (SMEC 2004). Textbooks for all
public schools are determined by the SMEC, which adheres to national and
municipal curriculum standards and schemes.
Since the 1990s, the SMEC has attempted to further the implementation
of quality-oriented education through promoting SBCD initiatives that have
either concentrated on non-examination areas or been designed to deepen
the basic course. Furthermore, as Tan (2013, 94) notes, schools are obliged
to ‘take orders, receive training and carry out speciﬁc school-based initia-
tives from the district authorities’. The SMEC (2004) stipulates school terms
and speciﬁes that each term includes 34 teaching weeks, 2 social practice
weeks and 4 weeks for examinations and special events; and a school day is
composed of 6–7 periods of 40 minutes, 15–20 minutes morning/noon
meeting and 35–40 minutes physical exercises.
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Teachers
Teachers in Hong Kong must be registered as either a ‘registered teacher’
or ‘permitted teacher’. The former are required to possess a recognised
teaching certiﬁcate in addition to a degree qualiﬁcation; they are given
permanent posts and allowed to teach all subjects. The latter do not need to
have a teaching certiﬁcate, but sign a temporary contract and can only teach
a few designated subjects (e.g. music, arts and sports) when registered
teachers are in shortage (ED 1994). Teachers are also categorised as either
Graduate (GM’s) or Certiﬁcated (CM’s) Masters/Mistresses; GM’s must
hold a university degree and are paid more than CM’s. Schools are only
permitted by the government to employ 85% of their salaries grant for
GM’s, despite the fact that 96% of secondary teachers are now trained uni-
versity graduates (EDB 2014b).
Principals are responsible for checking the eligibility of job applicants.
As soon as an appointment is conﬁrmed by an IMC, applications for teacher
registration are submitted to the EDB (ED 1994). As one principal
explained, the number of teachers that a school can hire depends on the per-
mitted number of classes and the stipulated teacher-to-class ratios. Aided
schools strictly follow the salary scales and allowances stipulated in the
Code of Aid. In contrast, DSS schools are not required to conform to the
proportion of GM and CM. This enables them to hire more junior CM staff
with comparatively lower salary costs and more supporting staff, such as
teaching assistants and administrators (Chan and Tan 2008).
In Singapore, the vast majority of teachers are ‘appointed teachers’; they
are degree holders, centrally selected and trained at the National Institute of
Education, appointed as civil servants and assigned to schools by the SMOE
based on central needs as well as their preferences. Although teachers can
request a different posting after two years, the request has to be approved
by the SMOE. Teachers are employed on the government salary scales as
soon as they are admitted to the National Institute of Education. In addition,
teachers are rewarded ﬁnancially according to their performance grades,
given by ‘reporting ofﬁcers’ (usually the heads of departments) and princi-
pals (Lee and Tan 2010). The annual performance bonus can amount to
between one and three months’ salary for average to outstanding performers
(Sclafani 2008).
Another type of teacher is the ‘contract teacher’ – they are not necessar-
ily trained and are only employed short-term to ﬁll temporary gaps. In real-
ity, as one SMOE ofﬁcer emphasised, the SMOE ‘would not allow schools
to have too many such posts’. Comparatively, independent schools have
more freedom in appointing teachers and setting salary scales within their
own budgets. Nonetheless, there are some regulative restrictions for
appointed teachers working in independent schools. For example, as one
scholar explained, after teaching for six years, teachers of independent
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schools have to make a choice – ‘either return to government schools, or
give up their government employment and sign a contract with the
independent school’.
In China, according to the 1993 Teacher Law, prospective secondary
teachers must hold a degree and a teaching certiﬁcate. In Shanghai, the
appointment of teachers is mainly administered at the district level. As
principals elaborated, district human resource bureaus and DEBs approve
the plan for budgeted teaching posts of every school. Schools scrutinise
applicants’ qualiﬁcations and organise trial teaching sessions. The district
Educational Human Resource Exchange and Service Centre interviews and
examines the school-selected candidates. The DEBs then authorise schools
to hire those they deem qualiﬁed. According to principals, ‘talents’ without
a teaching certiﬁcate may be given one-year probation in schools; they can
be transferred to more permanent terms only if they obtain a teaching
certiﬁcate within that year.
The ‘merit pay’ system has been implemented in Shanghai since 2009.
A teacher’s pay is now composed of 70% basic pay and 30% merit pay
(comprising 70% basic merit pay and 30% reward merit pay). The basic
pay and basic merit pay are standardised across all schools and determined
at the municipal level, according to teacher’s professional titles, responsibili-
ties and workloads; and the reward merit pay is decided by schools depend-
ing on teacher appraisal (SMEC 2009). In other words, as some principals
complained, under the new system, they only have the power to determine
30% of the bonus, which amounts to about 9% of the total pay. In 90% of
people-run schools, as Ding (2012) demonstrates, DEBs have put a large
proportion of their teachers on the government payroll. This attracts more
people to work in those schools and also enables DEBs to have a say in
their teacher appointments.
Comparison and discussion
Table 1 summarises the differences in the nature of school autonomy across
each of the three dimensions analysed. From this, it can be seen that the
images projected by English policymakers have little congruence with the
‘reality’. In other words, the policy initiatives promoted do not accord with
their evidential basis. Firstly, English secondary schools generally enjoy
higher levels of autonomy than their East Asian counterparties. Secondly,
drawing on Winstanley, Sorabji and Dawson’s (1995) distinction between
‘criteria power’ and ‘operational power’, whilst some ‘operational power’
has been granted to some schools in East Asia, schools in England have
been portrayed as being granted both ‘criteria’ and ‘operational power’.
However, the evidence (Higham and Earley 2013) is that, in contrast to the
policy rhetoric, in practice, school principals in England only see them-
selves as exercising ‘operational power’ and do not view themselves as able
12 Y. You and P. Morris
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to exercise ‘criteria power’. This is primarily because of the powerful inﬂu-
ence of the nature of the accountability system, which deﬁnes the criteria
by which successful schools are deﬁned, and which is centrally determined.
Notwithstanding, overall schools in England have a higher degree of
autonomy; for example, English head teachers are given the power to set
school terms and hours. The EDB provides a guideline as to the minimum
school days. The SMOE prescribes school terms and curriculum hours.
Schools in Shanghai must follow the calendar speciﬁed by the SMEC. With
regard to teachers’ salaries, in England, the total salary can be set by head
teachers, while in the three East Asian societies there are salary scales pro-
vided by their education departments. What can be decided by schools is
the annual performance bonus in Singapore and reward merit pay in Shang-
hai. Only a few schools, such as independent schools in Singapore, are free
to determine the entire salary. Both academies and free schools in England
are not under the control of local authorities, while all public schools in
Shanghai are directly governed and monitored by DEBs. Singapore also has
comparable intermediate levels of governance – cluster superintendents.
As noted above, whilst the system of school inspections and public
examinations in England encourages convergence, schools can in principle
promote their own belief systems (e.g. religious beliefs), choose textbooks
and select which examination board they use. In contrast, the powerful role
of the national/mainstream curriculum in East Asia is reinforced by the
states’ control over the textbooks used, teacher education and the existence
of a single national/central examination body. In essence, the national/cen-
tral exam is based wholly on the national/mainstream curriculum, which is
codiﬁed in the approved textbooks.
In England there are no restrictions on who can apply to establish pub-
lic-funded schools. Individuals (i.e., teachers and parents), educational
institutions (i.e., universities and independent schools), organisations (i.e.,
charities, community and faith groups) and businesses are all encouraged to
open and operate academics and free schools. In Hong Kong, sponsoring
bodies (i.e., faith groups, alumni associations and various organisations) are
permitted to set up aided and DSS schools; however, no school has been
established by teachers and parents. In Singapore and Shanghai,
governments (national/municipal/district) are the sole providers of public
schooling.
Whilst a teaching certiﬁcate is not compulsory in England to enter the
teaching profession; it is an expectation that is selectively relaxed in the
other societies. In fact, since 2005, the long-term policy in Hong Kong has
been to require all new teachers to be trained graduates (EDB 2014c); in
Shanghai, teaching certiﬁcate examinations are centrally designed and
organised; and teachers in Singapore are selected, employed and trained by
the SMOE.
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While reforms designed to increase school autonomy have been intro-
duced in East Asia, their nature differs signiﬁcantly from those promoted in
England. Firstly and most signiﬁcantly, in England, the reforms designed to
increase school autonomy are not targeted at all schools and pupils; all
schools are encouraged to convert to Academy status. Since August 2010,
the number of academies has increased from 203 to 2591 in March 2013
(Higham and Earley 2013). By January 2014, 57% of public secondary
schools had achieved academy status, catering for 59% of all secondary
pupils (DfE 2014). More than 240 free schools were operating and in 2015,
the newly elected Conservative Government launched the plan of 500 new
free schools a few weeks after taking ofﬁce (Wintour, Guardian, March 6,
2015). Notably, academies and free schools are neither given the formal
power to select pupils on academic merit nor to charge parents extra fees.
In contrast, greater autonomy in Singapore and Hong Kong has been
mainly transferred by the government to a small and selected number of
schools. In Hong Kong, although the DSS was not originally designed for
elite schools, the EDB revised the scheme in 2000 to allow DSS schools to
select pupils and charge fees and this attracted a number of prestigious
Band 1 aided schools (pupils are divided into three bands based on aca-
demic performance) to convert to DSS status. Providing these schools with
the power to select pupils and charge fees has introduced a degree of elitism
into the school system. This shift aligns the school system more closely
with a political and economic system that has, throughout colonial times
and currently, been dominated by an elite comprising the government and
business leaders (Goodstadt 2014). Hong Kong’s Chief Executive revealed
his own elitist views recently when he rejected demands that his post be
elected through more ‘open voting’. He explained: ‘you would be talking to
half of the people in Hong Kong who earn less than $1800 a month. Then
you would end up with that kind of politics and policies’. As Krugman
(2014) opines, his concern was that the bottom 50% of Hong Kong’s pop-
ulation would vote for policies that might aid the poor and harm the rich.
A central message in Singapore’s national narrative is that society gener-
ally, and schooling speciﬁcally, is underpinned by meritocracy and conse-
quently peoples life chances depend solely on their ability and hard work
(Mauzy and Milne 2002). In this context, more autonomy has been granted
to academically ‘high-ﬂying’ schools (i.e., 28 autonomous schools and 8
independent schools out of 170 public secondary schools), which usually
possess ‘capable principals, experienced teachers, a strong alumni network
and responsible governing boards’, and tend to recruit the most promising
and able pupils (Tan 2007, 307). In both Hong Kong and Singapore, ‘bet-
ter’ schools within selective educational systems have been allowed to exer-
cise greater autonomy. Both cases differ markedly from the situation in
England and are contrary to the claims in the SWP and OECD reports that
by being granted more autonomy, schools can better improve themselves.
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In terms of function, school autonomy in East Asia has involved a
‘recentralisation’, ‘decentralised centralisation’ or ‘centralised decentralisation’
through the allocation of operational power to selected schools by the state. For
example, Pang (2008, 30) points out that the introduction of IMCs in Hong
Kong has resulted in ‘the removal of the intermediate control structure’ of
SSBs, which has increased the central government’s control of schools. In
Singapore, Ng (2008, 122) argues that ‘the government still carries a great
responsibility for achieving national outcomes’ and what has been decentralised
is actually the tactical power of management.
With regard to the future, Singapore seems to have no plans to expand
independent and autonomous schools. The number of independent schools
has been maintained at 8 since 1992; 18 autonomous schools were set up
between 1994 and 1997, only 10 more schools have since been granted ‘au-
tonomous status’ (Tan 2009). In Hong Kong, the DSS schools have been
subject to increasing critical scrutiny as a result of ﬁnancial malfeasance in
some schools (Panel on Education 2014) and public concern about the
implications for equity associated with the high fees some charge, admis-
sions policies and more extensive ﬁnancial resources (Pong 2013). It seems
unlikely the scheme will be further expanded in the near future.
China’s decentralisation reforms since the mid-1980s, as Hawkins (2006)
argues, have been primarily driven by ﬁscal considerations – the central
government could not afford to wholly fund such a vast education system.
This has, in effect, resulted in more autonomy being transferred from the
centre to the local level, along with the responsibility for education provi-
sion. However, the decentralisation has mainly taken place at the municipal
level rather than the school level; in other words, educational policies and
practices in Shanghai are still highly centralised and standardised across all
schools in almost all the aspects examined above. Shanghai’s latest plans
have even proposed the standardisation at the municipal level of schools’
funding and facilities and teachers’ allocation and salaries in an attempt to
reduce the growing disparities across districts (SMEC 2010).
In contrast, school autonomy in England has been interpreted as a speci-
ﬁc means to achieve the marketisation of education driven by neo-liberalism
and neo-conservativism (Whitty, Power, and Halpin 2003). This has been
evident in a number of reforms aimed at promoting school competition, the
diversity of educational provision and greater parental choice. Signiﬁcant
policy initiatives include the 1988 Education Reform Act under the Con-
servative leadership, the introduction of academies during the New Labour
years and the expansion of academies and free schools by the Coalition
Government. Over the last four decades, successive Governments have con-
sistently sought to develop a ‘quasi market’ and redeﬁne the role of the
state in the education sector by transferring power from local authorities to
individual schools and promoting new types of highly autonomous schools.
As Glatter (2012) argues:
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… there is a distinctive element – the gradual defenestration of the intermediate
tier of government with an apparent goal of having just two signiﬁcant layers of
governance: the individual school operating in a competitive local market and a
distant central government and its agencies as the sole political authority. (570)
It is in the context of this wholesale belief in the self-evident beneﬁts of
school autonomy that English policymakers have sought external justiﬁca-
tion for their reforms. East Asia has provided a convenient, if not wholly
accurate, source of external referencing.
The promotion of school autonomy has operated in parallel with the
promotion of school accountability. Accountability systems introduced in all
four societies have inﬂuenced school-level decision-making and encouraged
conformity to national/central frameworks. However, the differences
between the accountability systems of the East Asian societies and that in
England are signiﬁcant and the nature of the accountability system in Eng-
land serves to maintain a more direct level of central control. In England,
school accountability is designed to raise standards by making information
and data about schools publicly available in order to assist parents to make
choices and to encourage competition between schools. The Ofﬁce for Stan-
dards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills allows ‘governing bodies
and head teachers to choose for themselves how to evaluate their work’
(DfE 2010, 69) and conducts external inspections to grade schools and pro-
duce public league tables. In contrast, school inspection information in
Singapore and Shanghai is not made public and formal league tables have
been abandoned in recent years (SMOE 2012; Tan 2013). In Hong Kong,
Territory-wide System Assessments, as part of the accountability mecha-
nism, are meant to inform policy and school improvement rather than make
comparisons. Moreover, in all three societies, self-evaluation has been
recentralised and standardised by specifying the targets, domains, standards
or performance indicators (Law 2007; Ng 2008; Tan 2013).
World Culture theorists acknowledge the existence of divergence across
education systems by drawing on the concept from organisational theory of
‘loose coupling’ (Orton and Weick 1990). But they focus on the generic
themes that policymakers across the world have promoted, and from this
claim that there is a convergence of policy to a ‘world model’ (Carney,
Rappleye, and Silova 2012). As demonstrated above, although substantive
reforms have been pursued under the common mantra of enhancing school
autonomy and been legitimated by referencing to ‘world-class’ systems/in-
ternational models, the scope, form and nature of implementation has both
varied markedly and been deﬁned by local contexts. Further, the variations
are not merely a function of implementation issues or local variants on a
common theme; as has been shown above, the nature, purpose and con-
ceptualisations of school autonomy are fundamentally different in each of
the contexts that have been studied.
18 Y. You and P. Morris
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 08
:07
 19
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
16
 
Conclusion
The UK Government has provided a distorted portrayal of external evidence
to endorse domestic policy-making (also see Morris 2012). Overall, the
level of school autonomy that operates in England is greater than that in
Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai, and in those societies it serves differ-
ent functions and is granted to different and selected providers.
More speciﬁcally, this paper demonstrates how the concept of school
autonomy has been reconstructed, incorporated or re-contextualised, and
reconceptualised to both reﬂect and advance the prevailing values/ideology,
or as Schriewer and Martinez (2004) terms it, the ‘socio-logic’, which drive
policy in each of the domestic contexts. In Hong Kong, school autonomy
has been used to strengthen the role of elite/fee-paying schools; in Singa-
pore, it was used to reinforce meritocracy by providing greater autonomy to
those schools catering for the academically most able pupils; and, in Shang-
hai, the priority was to devolve ﬁscal responsibility from the central to the
local. In marked contrast: autonomy in England was driven by a Libertar-
ian/Conservative desire to adjust the role of the state and to encourage
diversity and competition amongst and between all schools. As Nick Gibb
(2014) explained, the reforms designed to increase autonomy ‘reafﬁrmed’
his belief that ‘good government does not improve public services. It
enables public services to improve themselves’.
Rather than engaging in policy borrowing, the Government has selec-
tively referenced policies in East Asia in an attempt to promote and legiti-
mate its long preferred policy agenda. In other words, ‘East Asian education
systems’ have been employed as a ‘ﬂag of convenience’ (Lynch 1998) or a
form of ‘political theatre’ in order to provide legitimacy in England’s politi-
cal arena. This has resulted in a high degree of incongruence between the
English representation of East Asia and the ‘reality’ in this region, which
will not result in England adopting the same policies as those adopted by
the ‘world-class’ systems. However, the resulting very loose coupling
between the images and the ‘reality’ concerning school autonomy may not
be a major concern, as ‘world-class’ systems are, as has been shown above,
diverse in their own practices. As cited at the outset, if a cultural revolution
is indeed required in England, perhaps the best place to begin is by rectify-
ing the distorted images of East Asia that continue to dominate the political
and educational discourse in England.
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